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Although many contemporary American workers are drawn to the promise
of individual autonomy,' they also find themselves in a quandary. They are
2dissatisfied with the uncertainty of a world that appears to have fallen apart;2
they are waiting, yet they cannot fully articulate what they are waiting for.
+ Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful comments on earlier
drafts, I am grateful to Elizabeth MacKay. Research support was provided by the Law and
Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law.
1. A complete description of human rationality grounded in individual autonomy admits a
wide array of explanations for the choices that humans make without necessarily succumbing to
unconstrained greed. Rationality, economics, and self-interest, as such, do not necessarily defend
John Stuart Mill's claims in On Liberty, "where . . . flawed conceptions of autonomy and
individuality combine with an obsessional enmity to tradition and convention to yield a liberalism
in which rationalist hubris, antinomian individualism and a sentimental religion of humanity
reinforce and strengthen each other." JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 260 (1993).
2. Harry G. Hutchison, What Workers Want or What Labor Experts Want Them to Want?,
26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 799, 800 (2008) [hereinafter Hutchison, What Workers Want] (citing
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2005)).
3. CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD, at xxvii (Robin Dick trans., ISI Books 2003).
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Seeking freedom and liberation on the one hand,4 and on the other, workers
confront the contention that the workplace suffers from too much freedom and
too little control.5
In the face of such opposing contentions, it is no surprise that the
government has intervened. In fact, government-employment regulation has
risen substantially during the past century, reflecting the fact that "[t]he state
has permeated civil society to such an extent that the two are mostly
indistinguishable." 6 This dynamic has advanced since the latter part of the
nineteenth century and coincides with the rise of the Progressive Era; modem
hierarchs, however, aim to break limits and generally "assume the perfectibilty
of man and the conquerability, so to speak, of nature."7  Attempting "to
achieve great things in the face of life's perpetual disappointments," law
reformers, attracted to a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause9 and an
expansive understanding of the police power,10 have sought to implement a
new world order of labor relations-a world without industrial strife and
unrest-through ideologies and bureaucratic instruments." Progressive labor
reform began during President Herbert Clark Hoover's administration and
continues to develop today.12 Despite this consistent pursuit of progress,
workers are plagued by "allegations of falling or stagnant wages, increasing
employment uncertainty, and increasing disparities in nonwhite versus white
4. See Harry G. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues
Dispute with First Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1311-13 (2006)
[hereinafter Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest] (discussing the possibility that the decline in
union participation can be explained by individual motivations of autonomy and liberation).
5. See Thomas C. Kohler, Labor Law: "Making Life More Human" -Work and the Social
Question, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN
LAW 163, 180-81 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007) (describing the
American labor-law scheme as involving "controlled self-regulation" in which there is an absence
of state regulation in the "ordering of relationships").
6. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, To CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD 154 (2010).
7. Paul Seaton, Translator's Preface to CHANTAL DELSOL, UNJUST JUSTICE: AGAINST
THE TYRANNY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (Paul Seaton trans., ISI Books 2008).
8. Rex G. Carr, Book Review, 52 J. CHURCH & ST. 160, 160 (2010) (reviewing J. CALEB
CLANTON, RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: INQUIRY AND CONVICTION IN THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE (2008)).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce .. . among the several States . . . .").
10. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419-23 (1908) (holding that women are
afflicted with certain physical limitations, and the state is justified in restricting the conditions
under which they may work pursuant to its police power).
11. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006) (recognizing the
need for legal protection for employees who engage in collective bargaining).
12. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 2, at 800.
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unemplo rment rates," all of which may be linked to a rise in bureaucratic
control.
Although the federal government is an entity with limited and enumerated
powers,' the establishment of a new order of labor relations has been
fashioned by the pursuit of progress and exclusion. Through
pseudo-science' 6 and notions of fairness, labor-law reform advocates have
claimed "the moral high ground of public interest." 7  This move, consistent
with progressive presuppositions, has enabled reformers to assert that "their
programs and policies benefit[] the disadvantaged citizens they target[]."18 An
impartial examination of such programs and policies uncovers that they are
often tainted by the human tendency to use power unimpeded by moral
restraint for purposes of self-aggrandizing domination and abuse.19 This taint
frequently takes the form of consequences that place human liberty at risk and
further suppress the economic and social prospects of the marginalized portion
of society.
Most reform efforts represent a combination of law and sociology conducive
to statutory innovation. During the early part of the twentieth century, this led
to the construction of sociological jurisprudence.21 This development
contributed to a jurisprudential trend that surfaced as an intellectual force in
13. Id.
14. ROBERT A. LEVY & WILLIAM MELLOR, THE DIRTY DOZEN: HOW TWELVE SUPREME
COURT CASES RADICALLY EXPANDED GOVERNMENT AND ERODED FREEDOM 37 (2008).
15. Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"? From Plessy v. Ferguson to New
Deal Labor Law, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 33-36) [hereinafter
Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?], available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=1674048
(explaining that progressive labor reform was implemented as a discriminatory weapon against
"inferior" races); see also David E. Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Excluding Unfit Workers:
Social Control Versus Social Justice in the Age of Economic Reform, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 177, 177 (2009) (explaining that the original New Deal progressives designed labor
legislation to exclude certain classes of workers).
16. See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 177 ("[T]he exclusion of undesirables
acquired new scientific legitimacy.").
17. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 15, at 24.
18. Id.
19. See HUNTER, supra note 6, at 188 (suggesting that the natural disposition of the human
race is manipulating, dominating, and controlling).
20. See Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 15, at 34 ("[T]he
implementation and enforcement of labor law became a weapon to displace biologically suspect
workers. 'At times, such efforts were grounded in the ideology of white supremacy.' At other
times, the economic benefits of exclusion propelled union efforts." (quoting Harry G. Hutchison,
Employee Free Choice or Employee Forged Choice? Race in the Mirror of Exclusionary
Hierarchy, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 369, 400 (2010) [hereinafter Hutchison, Employee Free
Choice])).
21. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 811 (1998) (explaining the emergence of
sociological jurisprudence).
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constitutional law; it suggested "that the purpose of law is to achieve social
aims" that cannot be constrained by abstract notions of rights tethered to the
language of the Constitution. 2 2 This flight from the notion of individual rights
enabled progressives to argue that the Constitution could not constrain the
federal government's social and economic goals; this movement reached its
apotheosis during President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration. 23
Provoked by the U.S. Supreme Court's failure to permit the expansion of
state power that he favored, President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court.24
The Roosevelt administration sought public support for its scheme to
restructure the economy by offering plans and proposals involving a
substantial element of deception.25 For example, supporters of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) hoped that this statute "would rebuild the
American economy on the model of Mussolini's fascist Italy, then widely
regarded as a successful alternative to laissez-faire capitalism," thus
surreptitiousZ eliminating a number of widely accepted government
departments.
Consistent with its overall approach of ignoring the contrary views of
citizens, the Roosevelt administration, after the demise of the NIRA, pushed to
enact the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in the absence of strong public
support.2 7 "The NLRA marked the culmination of a systematic effort of the
progressive movement that dominated so much of American intellectual life
during the first third of the twentieth century." 28 Overall, it was an effort
aimed at creating a transformed society.29 Offering an iconic conception of
labor progress, this move was reified by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones
22. Id
23. See Laveta Casdorph, The Constitution and Reconstruction of the Standing Doctrine, 30
ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 485 (1999) (describing President Roosevelt's belief that "government
intervention was necessary to save the nation's economy" at a time when individual liberty and
government noninterference was the norm).
24. Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal
Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 659 (2003).
25. Id at 652 ("The Roosevelt Administration's strategy for gaining public support for the
NIRA apparently involved a substantial element of deception.").
26. Id. Specifically, "National Recovery Administration (NRA) Director Hugh Johnson
privately told Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins that 'when this crisis is over and we have the
recovery program started, there won't be any need for a Department of Labor or a Department of
Commerce' because their functions would be subsumed by the NRA." Id (citing FRANCIS
PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 240 (1946)).
27. See id. at 657-58.
28. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 1 (2009)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT].
29. See id. (noting that, prior to the Employee Free Choice Act, the NLRA was the most
progressive labor legislation enacted in America).
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& Laughlin Steel Corp.30 Accepting the contention that the NLRA regulated
labor practices "affecting commerce" and rejecting the distinction between
production and commerce, the Court announced that it "would no longer
define the commerce power in terms of the Tenth Amendment's reserved
power concepts." 1  The Supreme Court thus accepted the NLRA's stated
objective of eradicating industrial strife through collective bargaining.32
Departing from "the Lochnerian tradition of hostility to class legislation and
laws interfering with free labor markets,"33 the Court accepted pro-regulation
and declared "that it considered liberty of contract a nonfundamental right." 34
The publication of Richard Epstein's book, The Case Against the Employee
Free Choice Act, provides an opportunity to reconsider: (a) the movement to
use legislation and regulations, rather than the common law, to control labor
relationships; 3 5 (b) the original purpose of the NLRA; and (c) the revolutionary
implications of the effort to transform the NLRA into a law that favors
unionization.36 Describing the central provisions of the Employee Free Choice
Act (EFCA), its economic consequences, its constitutional implications, and its
connection to the decline of unionism, Epstein offers a balanced portrayal of
the EFCA that suggests that this statutory initiative is not likely in the interest
of most workers, employers, or the nation as a whole. Part I of this Article
describes Epstein's inspection of the EFCA, its most important provisions, its
institutional structure, and its probable economic consequences. Part II
maintains that a more comprehensive review of the EFCA and its inescapable
connection to progressive presuppositions indicates that the true enemy of
unionization is the American worker and the national interest. American
workers who are adequately informed of labor unions' ongoing participation in
the social control of work and the marginalization of workers, as well as union
participation in transformational politics financed by union dues revenues, are
likely to perceive the EFCA as an ill-considered statutory effort that most
Americans ought to reject. Properly appreciated, the EFCA joins a long line of
30. 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937); see also EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 2 ("Congress passed the original version of the NLRA (the
Wagner Act), which was upheld against constitutional challenges in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co. [sic].").
31. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.9, at 185 (7th ed.
2004).
32. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33-34.
33. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 98 (2001).
34. Id. at 7; see Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)
("[F]reedom to contract is a qualified and not an absolute right.").
35. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28 (discussing the
purpose of the creation of the NLRA).
36. Id. at 2 (describing the NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, as "respect[ing]
employee's collective choice on unionization").
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progressive law-reform proposals that would enable union hierarchs and their
philosophic allies to expand the realm of progressive hegemony and
subordinate the social, economic, and liberty interests of workers.
Beyond Epstein's manifestly correct emphasis on the proposal's unfairness
to workers and employers tied to possible union coercion and his assessment of
the initiative's adverse social-welfare implications for the nation, the case
against the EFCA should be expanded in two ways. First, Epstein's critique
could be enriched by deconstructing progressive presuppositions tied to this
initiative and by examining the disproportionately adverse, and persisting,
consequence of this proposal on marginalized Americans. Second, Epstein's
examination would be enhanced through understanding the EFCA as an
attempt by highly politicized labor unions to gain additional political revenue
for broad social purposes that are unrelated to both collective-bargaining
objectives and workers' actual preferences.
I. EPSTEIN'S ASSESSMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
A. Prolegomena
Epstein's book and his consequent analysis focus on the EFCA of 2007,"
but because an identical version of the proposal was introduced on March 10,
2009,3 this Article utilizes the most recent version for citation purposes. In
assessing the EFCA, Epstein provides a substantial, albeit incomplete,
background of the evolution of collective bargaining in the United States.
Throughout his analysis, he shows how the EFCA would change many of the
important provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and how those
changes would affect various constituencies.39
B. The Employee Free Choice Act Changes Everything
It is clear that the original language of the NLRA promoted labor
organization in the private sector.40 Subsequently, the NLRA was amended by
the Taft-Hartley Act.41 As amended, the NLRA continued to respect
employees' "collective choice on unionization," though it did not favor or
promote unionization.42 Rather, the Taft-Hartley Act explicitly stated that
37. See id app. at 177-81.
38. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
39. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 4-10
(explaining the specific provision of the NLRA that the EFCA seeks to change and the effects of
those changes on interested parties).
40. Id. at 2 (quoting National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449,
452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006))).
41. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 7, 61 Stat.
136, 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)).
42. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 2.
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employees "shall also have the right to refrain from" engaging in
self-organization, joining a union, or pursuing any other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining. 4 3 After providing this background,
Epstein makes two important claims regarding the original NLRA:
The two central pillars of the original NLRA have survived to this
day. The first was a system of union democracy whereby unions
could only obtain the rights of exclusive representation for firms if
they could prevail in elections held by secret ballot. If a union was
selected, both parties were under an obligation to negotiate in good
faith to work toward a collective bargaining agreement. In addition,
the legislative history of the NLRA went to great pains to establish a
second pillar of free negotiation.44
Although it purportedly "establish[es] an efficient system to enable
employees to form, join, or assist a labor organization,"45 the EFCA rejects
46both pillars. The legislation would substantially alter the NLRA by allowing
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to certify a labor organization as
the collective-bargaining representative without ordering a secret-ballot
election if "no other individual or labor organization is currently certified or
recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the employees in the
unit."47 As such, though the EFCA does not supply guidelines and procedures
for em loyees to designate a bargaining representative, it orders the NLRB to
do so.4
The EFCA contains three provisions that, if enacted, would significantly
change the institution of collective bargaining. 49  First, though the EFCA
would continue to allow secret-ballot elections, provided that a representation
petition supported by at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining
unit is filed, the bill would permit labor unions to use a card-check system
instead.5 0 Whether the addition of a card-check system will actually enable
43. Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 61 Stat. at 140; see also EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 2 (quoting Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 61 Stat. at 140).
44. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 4.
The legislative history of the Act states that "[t]he committee wishes to dispel any possible false
impression that this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit
governmental supervision of their terms." S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 12 (1935).
45. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
46. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 4.
47. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409 § 2(a)(6).
48. Id. § 2(a)(7) (mandating the NLRB to develop procedures for employees to declare a
representative).
49. See EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
4-6 (introducing the three most transformational provisions of the EFCA).
50. Id. at 4-5.
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workers' wishes to surface or not, as Epstein explains, this provision would
likely displace elections in nearly all representation cases.5
Next, Epstein notes that the "EFCA's second major provision would
introduce a system of compulsory interest arbitration that leads to a first
'contract' of two years duration." 52 The term "contract" is deceptive "because
an actual agreement representing the assent of both parties is not required
during this initial period." 5 3 Additionally, rather than being limited to wages
and benefits, the contract must encompass the issues that are usually decided
by agreement under the present NLRA system. 54  Epstein thoroughly
explicates why this change constitutes a core redefinition of collective
bargaining.55 Indeed, this provision would likely destroy collective bargaining
arising out of an organizing contest. Because it is conceptually possible that
initial arbitration decrees will lead to interest-arbitration extensions, this may
eliminate collective bargaining for time periods beyond the initial contract.56
Finally, Epstein explains that the EFCA's third major change "ties in closely
with the adoption of the card-check system, [and] substantially increases the
penalties imposed on employers for violations of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,
which prohibits discrimination against employees for union activities." 57
Taken together with the requirement that the NLRB give priority to unfair
labor practice (ULP) charges that arise in the course of organizing campaigns,
increased penalties for employers supports the advanta es that unions expect to
receive from the addition of the card-check alternative.
Major economic consequences accompany the EFCA's proposed changes,
which will "radically alter the balance of power between management and
labor."59 This impact will be felt differently by small and large businesses,
but, as Epstein argues, "the passage of [the] EFCA will create huge
dislocations in established ways of doing business that will in turn lead to large
losses in S roductivity." 60  This will result in a substantial social-welfare
reduction. Epstein adroitly shows that unions and their hierarchs will gain at
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5-6.
55. Id. at 4-10 (describing the consequences for both large and small businesses if they are
faced with an increased demand for unionization).
56. See id. at 98-100 (explaining that the "current law has little to say about compulsory
interest-arbitration, because it is so rare in the private sector," and noting that gaps in the EFCA
could allow an initial arbitral decree to extend to future contract negotiations).
57. Id at 6.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id
61. See id. at 6-7 (discussing the possibility that the EFCA will lead to less job creation and
more businesses operating overseas).
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the expense of employee liberty and the nation's economic interests through
this legal-reform initiative. 62
C. Epstein's Critique of the Employee Free Choice Act's Provisions
Demonstrating that the EFCA was poorly drafted, filled with troublesome
gaps, 64 and grounded in unwarranted assumptions about the causes of decline
in private sector unionization, Epstein illustrates how the proposal seeks to
bias law in favor of unions.66 Ignoring current labor-union campaign
advantages, 67 the proposal changes the calculus of costs and benefits in order
to supply additional advantages to labor unions within the parameters of an
organizing contest6 8 and creates a truncated card-check X rogram that exposes
workers to union coercion, intimidation, and deception. Epstein argues that
"[i]t is hard to imagine any process that is less democratic in either intention or
execution than the card-check rule under EFCA. The only clear winner of this
skewed and expedited process is the union leadership, which gains dues and
power through the successful certification campaign.
62. Id.
63. See id at 89 (arguing that the proposal offers no standards for mandatory arbitration,
does not ensure that checked cards are valid, particularly those cards collected before the passage
of the Act, and fails "to establish any standards before the organization drives begin").
64. See id at 70 (noting that the NLRB is charged with "developing procedures for
establishing the validity of signed authorizations designating bargaining representatives"'
(quoting Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11Ith Cong. § 2(a)(7)(B) (2009))).
65. Id at 13-18 (discussing the decline of unions in the United States and abroad and
arguing that those who support the EFCA refuse to consider the various causes of this decline).
66. Id. at 73-76. For example, § 2 of the EFCA only allows the card-check system for
workers who are not yet organized. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409 § 2(a)(6). In
addition, the card-check system, as designed by the drafters of the EFCA, cannot be used for
purposes of union decertification. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
ACT, supra note 28, at 73.
67. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, 42-43
(noting that unions have advantages with the secret-ballot system because they can time the
campaign; define the bargaining unit, which enables them to shrink or expand the unit to increase
the odds of prevailing; have "exclusive possession [of] the signed authorization cards"; receive a
list of names and home addresses of all union members after the petition is filed; and make
promises of benefits or threaten workers if they refuse to support the union because unions are not
governed by the restrictions on employer speech (citing Strengthening America's Middle Class
Through the Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor
& Pensions of the H. Comm on Educ. & Labor, Il0th Cong. 82 (2007) (statement of Charles I.
Cohen, Senior Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP)).
68. Id at 68-70 (showing how the EFCA's proposed card-check system provides gains to
unions while simultaneously disadvantaging workers who may feel trapped or intimidated into
signing a card despite the costs of unionization).
69. Id.
70. Id at 73.
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Although the EFCA would reward union-sponsored intimidation and
fabrication, it would do little to constrain the impact of employer abuse on the
election process, which is an ostensible purpose motivating the authors of this
7 1 72proposal. This is so because employer abuse is largely imaginary.
Nonetheless, the EFCA envisions a substantial increase in penalties for
employer ULPs committed during organizing campaigns in response to the
allegation that illegal employer resistance has fueled union decline.n
Epstein punctures the employer-hostility thesis by showing that
private-sector unionization has declined for reasons that are independent of
employer intimidation, which is consistent with conclusive evidence that
shows a reduction in union density in most western countries. 74 This is also
true of countries that have instituted specific labor legislation; for example
Australia, France, Great Britain, and Ja an have seen their union-density rate
fall faster than that of the United States. In addition, a critical examination of
data on American employees fired during a union-organizing campaign
severely undermines the contention that private-sector union decline is largely
a function of employer hostility. 76
Relying on J. Justin Wilson's analysis, Epstein reveals that during a
three-year period from 2003 to 2005, 11,342 organizing petitions were filed
with the NLRB.77 Of the 1538 NLRB unfair-practice cases involving remedial
action, however, only 303 arose during the course of an organizing campaign,
implying that the likelihood of an improper firing during the course of a union
organizing campaign is only 2.7%. The thrust of this analysis, which is
corroborated by other commentators, indicates that the employer-hostility
71. See id. at 43-46 (explaining that a check-card system may result in workers being
pressured by both unions and employers and noting that the statute itself "purports to empower
workers to exercise their 'free choice"' in union elections).
72. Id. at 54-67 (showing that employer-abuse claims are largely unsubstantiated and that
unfair-labor practices have had little impact on the rate of unionization in the United States).
73. Id. at 13, 18-19.
74. Id. at 14 tbl.I (showing substantial declines in unionization in Australia, the European
Union, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, and more modest declines in Canada, Italy, and South Korea).
75. Id. at 13, 14 tbl.l.
76. See J. JUSTIN WILSON, CTR. FOR UNION FACTS, UNION MATH, UNION MYTHS: AN
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT DATA ON EMPLOYEES FIRED DURING UNION ORGANIZING
CAMPAIGNS 1, 5 (2008), available at www.unionfacts.com/downloads/Union MathUnion_
Myths.pdf.
77. See EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
51 (citing WILSON, supra note 76).
78. Id. This calculation reflects the fact that the number of remedial actions in organizing
campaigns (303) divided by the number of organizing campaigns (11,342) equals 2.7%. See id.
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thesis cannot explain union decline. 79  The evidence exposes as false the
contention that the existing NLRA system "gives management near-veto power
over whether workers can achieve such union representation, through
their critical role in NLRB-supervised elections." Reliance on the
employer-hostility thesis enables union advocates to disregard evidence that
traditional labor organizations find it difficult to fully respect the diversity in
individual variations in the tastes and demands of workers, particularly
those of women and minorities.81 A lack of respect for differences among
employees and between workers and union leaders, coupled with the ongoing
movement of some workers to embrace expressive individualism, 82 reveals that
labor-union advocates have missed the target. This, combined with evidence
that traditional unions are "out of step with current economic practices,"
explains that unions are "increasingly irrelevant to the bulk of workers and
employers" and creates a lack of demand for unionization.83  Many labor
sympathizers admit as much.84 Unions require solidarity, which "denotes the
ability of people to cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions."85 Because
American workers tend to favor their autonomy and mobility, "the consequent
loss of labor solidarity plays a role in the ongoing decline in union density, as
well as a 'loss of legitimacy for unions as the enablers of group action."' 86
Although these factors increasingly contribute to the ongoing reduction in
demand for labor unions, they are often conveniently overlooked by union
advocates.
A crucial issue afflicting the EFCA is the proposal's flight from democracy,
which is evidenced in its provisions that limit employee voice in representation
79. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America, 49
WAYNE L. REV. 685, 695-97 (2003) (repudiating the current viability of the employer-hostility
thesis and showing that employers were much more hostile to labor unions during the 1940s).
80. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 185 (updated ed.
2006) (explaining the flaws in U.S. labor law).
81. See Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1348 (1997) (finding evidence that unions have often
furthered the interests of their traditional "white male constituents at the expense of the interests
of women and minorities").
82. See Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a
Cause for Labor's Decline, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE:
ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 3-1, at 41, § 3-2(a), at 43 (Samuel
Estreicher ed., 1998).
83. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 80.
84. See id.
85. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 135 (1996).
86. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 2, at 823 (quoting James J. Brudney,
Reflections on Group Action and the Law ofthe Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1996)).
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campaigns.87 In contrast, numerous labor-union advocates assert that one of
the chief benefits of labor unions is that they allow employees' voices to be
heard within the workplace. This contention is amplified by the assertion
that "[t]here is a major gap in America between what workers want by way of
democratic say at their workplace and what they have." 89 Although such
sentiments fuel EFCA advocacy, when aptly comprehended they represent a
capitulation to irony because the EFCA as written would allow union hierarchs
to exercise their democratic rights by encouraging workers to join a union;
however, it would equally prevent dissenting workers from having a voice in
the democratic process that the existing representation-election system
allows.90 This is so because the EFCA disrespects the democratic process for
currently unorganized workers. Although the statute clearly "purports to
empower workers to exercise their 'free choice[,]' [it] necessarily, and by its
own terms, disenfranchises a potentially large fraction of them." 91 As such, the
language and grammar of the EFCA signifies a fundamental misunderstanding
of the "central objective of the NLRA by ignoring the key language in section
7 of the Act that states in addition to the 'right of self-organization,' workers
'shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities' if they
choose not to join a union."92
The EFCA's failure to vindicate employee rights is compounded by virtue
of existing levels of union intimidation.93  Indeed, intimidation is further
incentivized by the EFCA because workers could no longer take refuge in
secret-ballot elections that enable them to correct or invalidate signatures
that labor unions obtain through coercion. 94  As Epstein points out, this
controversial possibility, which suggests that union hierarchs possess an
aristocracy of knowledge with respect to workers' best interests and that this
knowledge ought to be imposed on workers without their informed consent,
has provoked a sharp response by labor's traditional supporters.95  For
example,
87. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11Ith Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2009) (providing
the NLRB with the ability to certify a labor representative without an election by employees).
88. See, e.g., Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in
Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 173, 174 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (arguing that unions
give workers the ability to use their collective voice and participate more in the workplace).
89. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 80, at 184.
90. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 44.
91. Id
92. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)).
93. See id. at 45-46 (explaining that EFCA supporters often ignore the fact that union
organizers also use intimidation techniques during union elections).
94. Id
95. Id at 46.
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former Democratic senator and presidential nominee George
McGovern condemned EFCA because of its failure to take into
account the obvious: "There are many documented cases where
workers have been pressured, harassed, tricked, and intimidated into
signing cards that have led to mandatory payment of dues." And he
pointedly asked why it is that a protection that Americans think
desirable outside the United States should be dispensed with here:
"Some of the most respected Democratic members of Congress ...
have advised workers in developing countries such as Mexico to
insist on the secret ballot when voting as to whether or not their
workplaces should have a union. We should have no less for
employees in our country." 96
The failure to protect employees' liberty interests is further complicated
because a successful card-check campaign does not promote democracy or
encourage negotiations.9 7 Rather, it promotes "'interest' arbitration, whereby
union recognition necessarily leads to a guaranteed first contract instead of a
union election" without providing workers with a correlative right to seek
union decertification through the same process.98 This signifies that the EFCA
is neither aimed at balancing the playing field nor intended to vindicate
workers' rights. In the context of this proposal, union democracy becomes
highly theoretical and highly unlikely.
Epstein exposes other core issues, including the fact that the proposal as
presently written (1) permits the acceptance of invalid signatures because the
EFCA does not require unions to have the employee's signature witnessed,
implying that incentives for fraud exist; 99 (2) enables unions to collect cards
without outside supervision,too affirming that "there is no way a card-check
system could replicate the reliability and freedom of expression provided by a
secret ballot election";oi (3) mandates arbitration without integrating this
approach with the NLRA's existing obligation to bargain in good faith; 2 (4)
skews the collective-bargaining process by discouraging good-faith
bargaining;103 and (5) authorizes compulsory arbitration without any
96. Id (quoting George McGovern, My Party Should Respect Union Ballots, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 2008, at A 13).
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id. at 67.
101. Id at 76.
102. Id. at 83-84 (describing the impact that interest arbitration will have on labor relations
given the wide discretion that arbitrators will have because of the lack of procedural statutory
requirements).
103. Id. at 82. 87-88.
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standards.104 Notably, with regard to its arbitration requirement, the statute
fails to provide guidance regarding the constitution of arbitration panels, the
scope of their authority, or which matters will be subject to review.105 The
EFCA also does not provide any standards relevant to issuing an arbitral
award. o0 The implementation of an arbitration mandate instantiates a coercive
proceeding but neglects to set out rules by which both parties will be bound. 0 7
The card-check scheme and the mandatory interest-arbitration provision,
when paired with the imposition of increased penalties on employers who
violate a provision of the NLRA by discriminating against em loyees for
union-organizing activities, shifts power to labor organizations.lo Although
increased penalties relate to ULPs by employers, as Epstein shows, the EFCA
fails to "establish any tight relationship between the supposed wrong and the
curative legislation." 109  This failure is exacerbated because the proposal
neglects to increase penalties on unions for any ULPs they might commit.110
This lacuna ignores existing levels of labor unions' violent coercion 11 and
confirms Epstein's intuition that strengthening enforcement against employers
"tilts the scale in unions' favor, without any effective mechanism for
remedying abuses associated with union authorization cards or petitions."'
1 2
Epstein lucidly and consistently shows that aggressive action, including
constant threats, may assist labor unions in winning recognition and fueling
union coffers without doing anything to improve the welfare of the firm's
workers.1 3
D. Epstein's Analysis of the Employee Free Choice Act's Social Consequences
Although Epstein's book identifies many of the adverse effects of the EFCA,
his analysis lacks a recognition of the historical roots of labor organizations
and the consequences that progressive ideas and presuppositions have on the
104. Id at 88-89.
105. Id. at 88.
106. Id at 89.
107. Id. at 88-89. Further, the gaps in the EFCA include the absence of a provision
governing successor liability. Id. at 93. Moreover, "[t]he imposition of the scheme of
compulsory arbitration in labor disputes will increase costs and uncertainty in negotiations." Id.
at 100.
108. Id at 6.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id. at 18-19.
Ill. See, e.g., GEORGE C. LEEF, FREE CHOICE FOR WORKERS: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO
WORK MOVEMENT 1-3 (2005) (describing the plight of a United Parcel Service worker worker
who, after declining to participate in a 1997 strike called by Teamsters Local 769, was severely
beaten and stabbed in the chest with an ice pick by labor-union militants).
112. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 21.
113. See id. at 24-32 (discussing the aggressive techniques unions employ).
588 [Vol. 60:575
2011] Employee "Free" Choice: The Mirror ofLiberty and Fairness
current market.l 14 Epstein shows that "employment laws are perceived as the
primary regulatory threat facing American firms today-even without
EFCA."1ls He also claims that "[t]he adoption of EFCA will only compound
the problem with its twin threats of card check and compulsory arbitration"
and that "legal reforms can never produce social gains by shrinking the size of
the pie, which is what always happens when administrative costs go up and
productive output goes down.,"1 6 This foundation supplies a defensible basis
to ascertain "how EFCA will affect four groups: unions, employees,
employers, and all third parties." 17
First, Epstein explains that the EFCA enhances unions' ability to organize
and en8ge in advantageous political activity, thus increasing their financial
power. As explicated below, this point deserves amplification because
evidence shows that labor unions are increasingly (perhaps primarily) focused
on taking political action in pursuit of political, social, and ideological
objectives outside the parameters of the workplace. Union leaders and their
allies often capture ideological and psychological benefits at the expense of the
interests of workers and the general public.119 In other words, the goal of
remediating problems within the workplace may no longer be the primary
driver of union activism.
Second, turning to the EFCA's effect on workers, Epstein maintains that
ambiguity surrounds this group's position.120 With regard to what a worker
risks and enjoys from engaging union activity, Epstein concedes that the
traditional and still-prevailing viewpoint is "that the NLRA allows unions to
exercise on behalf of their members some degree of monopoly power, which in
turn allows them to raise wages, reduce hours, and otherwise improve working
conditions."l21 This position is largely correct aside from the cases of workers
114. Epstein does not discuss the fact that progressives were driven by a commitment to
social Darwinism and pursued power and influence at the expense of the weak and the unfit. See
Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 179-80 (discussing the motives of progressives). Their
analysis exposes the progressives' concurrent liberal and conservative ideologies wherein white
males were deemed worthy of assistance, while women, minorities, immigrants, and defectives
were deemed unworthy. Id. Thus understood, progressive ideas emerged in numerous statutes,
such as minimum-wage laws, that interfered with the market on behalf of "worthy" individuals
and further disadvantaged members of groups perceived as unworthy. Id. at 186-90; see also
infra Part II.A.
115. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1391-94 (showing that
organizing increases union dues revenues, enabling leaders to achieve political benefits that are
not necessarily in workers' interests).
120. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
111-12.
121. Id. at 112.
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who are laid off or who otherwise remain unemployed as a result of the
presence of a labor union. Still, the traditional view of union power likely
overstates union influence given that increased global trade and improved
infrastructure have created a more competitive economy in recent decades.122
Nevertheless, monopoly power can result in a wage differential that favors
unionized workers. 2 3  Some estimates place the union wage and benefit
advantage at somewhere between eight and twenty percent.124 But such
estimated benefits, though confirming that economic rents are available, do not
offer any measure of overall social welfare or indicate how benefits are
distributed.125 Complexity often surfaces when the individual interests of
workers diverge because of the distributive benefits attending seniority within
a unionized workforce. 126  The increased use of lower-wage scales further
complicates an analysis of worker benefits, as they disfavor new hires in
-127
companies facing economic strain.
Epstein argues that "[u]nion monopoly power is a constant threat but not a
uniform presence." 28 The EFCA exemplifies how the legislative process can
be used to increase unions' monopoly power.129  If the EFCA is enacted,
Epstein concludes that some workers will be adversely affected because firms
will either contract work out or go out of business entirely if their productivity
fails to rise in the face of higher wages.1 30 Other "firms will invest their capital
in the nonunion portions of the business," which would again vitiate the
economic position of unionized workers.131 Of course, some would remain in
business with a unionized workforce, and workers who retain their jobs could
reap the economic benefit achievable through unionization, which is abetted by
the adoption of the EFCA.132 Taken as a whole, this picture is ambiguous
122. Id at 112-13.
123. Id. at 113.
124. See id. at 113 ("Workers in unions earn 30 percent higher wages, are 59 percent more
likely to have employer-based health coverage, and four times more likely to have pension
benefits." (quoting Mike Link, Anna Burger: The Economic Recovery Program Our Nation
Needs, SEIU BLOG (Dec. 12, 2008, 2:48 PM), http://www.seiu.org/2008/12/anna-burger-the-
economic-recovery-program-our-nation-needs.php) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. Id. at 114.
126. Id. It is likely that such age-related differences in workers' benefits may lead to
intergenerational conflicts. Id.
127. Herman Rosenfeld, The North American Auto Industry in Crisis, MONTHLY REV., June
2007, at 28 (explaining that the autoworkers union responded to the large market losses of the
Detroit Big Three by "bargain[ing] for two-tier wages for new hires in the 2007 agreement," thus
cutting wages for new hires in half).
128. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 113.
129. See id. (discussing data showing that historically, union members have had higher
wages than nonunion workers).
130. Id. at 123-24.
131. Id. at 124.
IT2 Id
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because it remains possible that monopoly wage gains may offset the overall
productivity losses of the firm and because some workers may either receive
uneven financial benefits through unionization or lose their jobs.133
Third, in contrast to the ambiguous picture with respect to workers, it is
doubtful that the EFCA would provide any positive benefits to employers.
Epstein bracingly suggests that a suspension of belief is required in order to
seriously consider the proposition that unionization benefits employers
wherein "a nonunionized firm should fret if its rival obtained a competitive
advantage from being unionized."1 34 He contests as incredible the assertion
that unionization is beneficial to firms and accordingly states that the EFCA
ought to be viewed as an opportunity to advance America's social-welfare
interests.1 35 This claim, once unpacked, operates as a form of self-deception
and assumes that employers are "ignorant of their own business interests when
they oppose unions whose innovations could enhance productivity and
profits." 36 This resilient allegation is stubbornly offered despite the fact that
firm managers have every incentive to oppose unionization while labor
sympathizers in economics, law, and labor relations have every incentive to be
wrong. 137 Incentives to be wrong arise when labor-union advocates can obtain
ideological, political, and even economic benefits through their advocacy.13t
The existence of such incentives explains why pro-union scholars "buy into an
inaccurate parody of labor relations in unregulated firms which claims that any
union presence has to improve relationships in the workplace."1 39  This
defenseless abstraction enables labor-union advocates to ignore evidence that
existing techniques available to nonunion firms are sufficient for them to
handle issues of internal management, thus vitiating the claim that labor unions
actually solve problems for employers. 140
Finally, Epstein offers a three-part analysis-divided into the allocative
effects, the distributional consequences, and disruption and dislocation-to
show that the EFCA's third-party effects are decidedly detrimental to
society.141 In so offering, he reasons that "the introduction of the original
NLRA in 1935 shrank the size of the pie available to employers and employees
by imposing external restrictions that prevent the emergence of dynamic
133. Id. at 124-25.
134. Id. at 125.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 126.
137. Id
138. See, e.g., Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1389-92 (showing that
union insiders and union outsiders, such as academics operating as ideological allies of labor
unions, gain benefits through unionization).
139. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 135.
140. Id. at 140.
141. Id. at 141-56.
591
Catholic University Law Review
competitive markets."l 42 Although society will likely accept these losses as a
trade-off for increased unionization, this societal satisfaction with the status
quo does not necessarily translate into a commitment to the EFCA.143
Epstein goes on to argue that unionization has greater adverse effects under
the EFCA because it is more intrusive than the NLRA on the relationship
between the employer and its employee. 144 In addition, such harmful effects
extend beyond unionized businesses currently subject to NLRB supervision.145
Businesses with employees also engage in many different transactions with
customers, suppliers, and lenders, and these third-party interactions, too, may
be regulated by the NLRA.146 As Epstein explains:
Whenever labor law prohibits a firm from subcontracting-or
from altering its current production model using current workers-it
not only makes the operation of the regulated firm less efficient than
it would otherwise be, but it also imposes losses on potential trading
partners who necessarily have fewer options in the market. 147
Such epiphenomena are felt throughout the economy, creating social losses
for a number of reasons.148 Consistent with this pattern, the EFCA is likely to
induce social-welfare losses in the form of increased unemployment. This is
so because if the EFCA, in a transparent effort to boost labor regulation,
succeeds in raising union-density rates by even one percentage point,
unemployment will likely increase by 0.30 percent.149 This indicates that "if
union density were to return to its 1995 level of 14.9 percent, . . . the U.S.
unemployment rate would increase by 0.83-0.99 percentage points." 50
142. Id at 141.
143. Id
144. Id at 141-42.
145. Id at 142.
146. Id.
147. Id
148. Id Epstein explains that
social losses from lost opportunities are not entirely offset by the less efficient
relationships adopted in their place, for strategies of mitigation can only reduce, not
eliminate, the losses. Even in the absence of such direct prohibitions, a strong labor
regime will influence the welfare of both suppliers and customers through the price
mechanism. The lower output by the unionized firm implies that it will purchase fewer
complementary goods and services from its suppliers.... It will also ship fewer goods
or render a smaller level of services to third persons.
Id.
149. See id. at 145 (citing Anne Layne-Farrar, An Empirical Assessment of the Employee
Free Choice Act: The Economic Implications 22 (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-1353305 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink)).
150. Id. (quoting Anne Layne-Farrar, An Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice
Act: The Economic Implications 22 (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)). Although
Epstein's book seems to quote the Layne-Farrar piece, the exact quote does not appear in her
manuscript.
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In examining the distributional consequences of the EFCA, Epstein argues
that, to the extent that observers are concerned about increased differentials in
wealth in the United States, they should be wary of the passage of this
proposal. 51  Conceding that the reasons for this differential are easily
discernable, Epstein maintains it largely results from differential opportunities
for education and the consequent effects on productivity in the current world of
advanced technology. 152 Thus understood,
[t]here is nothing that can be done through unionization to alter
that distribution of power, for if the competitive wage falls for
persons with little or no education, as it surely has in the past
generation or so, the monopoly power of unionization starts from a
lower base, which makes it unlikely that it could ever offset that
decline, especially since the increased supply of nonunion workers
153poses at least some limitation on the power to raise these wages.
To be sure, some observers contend that the original NLRA strengthened
middle-class status; however, Epstein notes that there is no evidence to support
this claim.' 54  Instead, increased incomes follow increases in productivity,
which in turn result from innovation that generates more overall wealth.' 55 He
argues that because unions often apply pressure to decrease productivity, there
is no basis to believe that the EFCA, if passed, will improve middle-class
conditions.156 Additionally, because union members have varied identities,
such as pension-fund beneficiaries and consumers, any gains that they may
realize as a result of the EFCA are likely to be tempered by a reduction in
share prices of pension-fund assets and by rising prices for consumer items.157
Lastly, the EFCA will lead to increased disruption and dislocation because it
would introduce uncertainty that may result in acrimonious negotiations and
frustrated expectations for the parties involved. For instance, because it is
possible that mandatory arbitration will continue beyond the initial two-year
contract period, it would likely produce one of two things.15 9 If the proposed
151. Id. at 154.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 154-55.
156. Id. at 155. Downward pressure on productivity arises for several reasons including the
fact that employers, in response to the threat of unionization, may make "socially wasteful
decisions solely for defensive reasons." Id. at 150. For instance, firms may physically relocate to
antiunion areas, increasingly rely on machinery, or move certain production activity overseas. Id.
157. Id. at 155. Additionally, benefits may also be offset by losing jobs that move overseas.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 155-56.
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arbitration arrangement is extended forward in time,' 60 "it will lead to
contraction of business or bankruptcy, which is itself a source of tension."l61
Alternatively, if the arbitration scheme does not move forward beyond the first
contract period, it is likely that employer resistance will be intensified. 16 2
Either way, according to Epstein, labor unrest is likely to rise during the
current downturn in the economy.
In addition, as Epstein explains, there should be no presumption that the
EFCA is constitutional. 164 In fact, the statute may raise First Amendment
considerations, particularly with respect to card-check and interest
arbitration. 165 It is doubtful that Congress seriously considered the relevant
constitutional issues, such as freedom of speech and assembly, in relation to
the EFCA.
Considered as a whole, Epstein's placement of the EFCA within the
pantheon of American labor law is both thought provoking and largely
accurate. Moreover, it is likely that only commentators offering weak,
inadequate arguments could contest Epstein's claim that the EFCA, if enacted,
would radically alter the balance of power between management and labor,
lead to distributive costs and benefits among workers, have a negative impact
on America's productivity, and induce some employers to shift capital and
other resources overseas. Epstein illustrates the unfairness of a system that
would allow workers and employers to be victimized by union coercion tied to
a card-check system that is capable of being manipulated. He demonstrates
that the status quo, however imperfect, "will outperform any system that
adopts card-check rules for union recognition and compulsory arbitration for a
two-year 'first contract,' augmented by tougher penalties for employer
ULPs."16 ' The EFCA would vitiate social welfare and lead to disruptions in
employment, neither of which is in the public interest, while at the same time
compromising human liberty. Such observations lead Epstein to conclude
that the "[1]egislation often promises grand improvements, only to be
entrenched before its failures become evident. The correct presumption in all
cases is that further legislation, being costly, has to be shown to be a good, or
160. See id. at 98-100 (explaining the process of extending interest arbitration beyond the
initial contract period generated by card-check signatures).
161. Id. at 156.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 157.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 176.
167. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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otherwise it should be treated as harm."' 68 He rightly argues that the EFCA
fails that test.' 69
Still, Epstein's analysis could be enhanced in at least two ways. The first
would be to situate the EFCA within the rich history and weltanschauung of
the progressive movement, considering both the past and present consequences
of progressive thought for marginalized Americans. A recapitulation of
progressive assumptions is a necessary predicate for understanding and
comprehensively critiquing the EFCA and its likely long-term impact on
members of disadvantaged communities. Second, a richer understanding of
the EFCA surfaces through a critical examination of unions' pursuit of
additional revenues, such as union dues, in order to fuel their pursuit of
political power. In order to develop a more complete case against the EFCA,
one must unpack progressive presuppositions and errors in logic and judgment,
as well as the labor unions' aggressive pursuit of union dues revenue.
1I. LIBERTY, FAIRNESS, AND SOCIAL WELFARE
A. The Past as a Prologue to a Transformational Future
Properly situating the EFCA within the rich tapestry of progressive thought
is not difficult. Amn the best places to start is with the work of Bernstein,1
7 0
Vedder and Gallaway, 71 Pestritto,172 and Moreno,173 among others.174 Indeed,
Professor Epstein has made an enormous contribution to the literature
168. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 176.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 5 (discussing the effect of labor regulations from
Reconstruction to the New Deal, and how those regulations adversely affected blacks).
171. See RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT
AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA, at xii-xiii (1993) (tracing the history of
U.S. unemployment patterns, critiquing the developments that have shaped unemployment, and
concluding that the state's fiscal manipulations have increased unemployment).
172. See RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 283 (2005) ("[President] Wilson was a central figure in progressivism's fundamental
rethinking of traditional American constitutionalism."); see also AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM: A
READER (Ronald J. Pestritto & William J. Atto eds., 2008) (providing an overview of the
Progressive Era by focusing on those individuals whose writings have influenced present
politics).
173. See PAUL D. MORENO, BLACK AMERICANS AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEW HISTORY
287 (2006) (detailing the antagonistic relationship between blacks and labor unions, and
discussing the various rationales behind it).
174. See, e.g., JONAH GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LEFT FROM MUSSOLINI TO THE POLITICS OF MEANING 16 (2007) (drawing
comparisons between Progressive Era policies and fascism); AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN
MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 13 (2007) (highlighting the class of
individuals left out of the Progressive Era reforms).
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himself' 75  by showing how competitive processes were replaced by
state-sponsored cartels 6 and how labor-law regulation has harmed many
Americans.177 Essential to any examination of the EFCA is a brief assessment
of the goals, objectives, and presuppositions undergirding progressive
architecture, which surfaced during the Progressive Era. Equally essential is a
brief review of the baleful distributional consequences of New Deal programs,
which represented, and continue to represent, the instantiation of progressive
thought.
Progressive reformers went to work between the 1890s and the 1920s,
responding to industrialization that moved the nation toward an industrial
economy and to increased urbanization.178 As Bernstein and Leonard explain,
[a]s elitists, the progressives believed that intellectuals should
guide social and economic progress, a belief erected upon two
subsidiary faiths: a faith in the disinterestedness and incorruptibility
of the experts who would run the welfare state they envisioned, and a
faith that expertise could not only serve the social good, but also
identify it.179
Economists and reformers played a leading role in the expansion of
government intervention in the economy, but they were not necessarily
one-dimensional.18 0  Instead, they were "simultaneously conservative and
,,181liberal. Many were "enthusiastic biologizers" who believed that race
175. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 135
(2006) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION] (setting forth
the argument that Progressive reformers transformed the Constitution to reflect their own
intellectual ideas); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) ("New Deal legislation is in large
measure a mistake that, if possible, should be scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible
common law regime . . . .").
176. See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at
52-53. Epstein argues that
Progressives attacked the two doctrines that most limited the scope of government
power-federalism, on one hand, and the protection of individual liberty and private
property, on the other. Although they ultimately prevailed on both fronts, they and
their ideas come out second best as an intellectual matter. However grandly their
rhetoric spoke about the need for sensible government intervention in response to
changed conditions, the bottom line, sadly, was always the same: replace competitive
processes, by hook or by crook, with state-run cartels.
Id.
177. See id. at 89-92 (explaining how labor regulations harmed women by viewing them as
inferior to men).
178. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 178.
179. Id. at 179-80.
180. Id at 179.
18 1. Id.
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determined worth.182 Progressives maintained ambivalent views toward
economically marginalized groups, such as the working poor.1 Their liberal
inclinations sought social justice, but their conservative beliefs yearned for
social control.' 8  They reconciled this tension by supporting assistance for
some and simultaneously seeking to suppress poor people who were seen as
threats to the nation's public health, wealth, and social advancement.18s
At their very inception, progressive ideas were pregnant with future adverse
distributional effects for members of certain communities. Relying on
scientific advancement for legitimacy, some intellectuals concluded that
Darwinian progress was not only possible, but inevitable., 87 Progressive law
reformers stressed a commitment to societal efficiency and sought to accelerate
the nation's preordained advancement; the initiatives they developed were tied
to the belief that public opinion should not stand in the way of the
transformative sociology offered by social planners.1s Relying on an appeal
to hereditary fitness, many progressives sought to rid the labor force of "unfit
workers: the immigrants, African Americans, women, and other
'defectives."'l 89  This effort resulted in disfranchisement, segregation, and
discrimination that stalled the economic progress of blacks from 1900-1920190
and threatened the advancement of women.191 For better or for worse, the
Progressive Era signified the low point of race relations in the United Statesl92
as well as the apex of claims that there is a scientific basis for female
inferiority.193
182. Id at 179-80.
183. Id at 180.
184. Id at 179.
185. Id. at 180.
186. See id. at 177 (suggesting that the progressive ideology of excluding certain groups of
people was not new to U.S. policy).
187. See id (acknowledging the use of eugenics to exclude from society those deemed
undesirable).
188. See GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 95 (discussing President Woodrow Wilson's
intellectual development as a prototypical illustration of how German ideas influenced American
Progressivism).
189. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 180.
190. MORENO, supra note 173, at 82.
191. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (upholding regulations limiting
hours of work which were grounded in the progressive presumption that women were inferior
beings).
192. MORENO, supra note 173, at 82.
193. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 n.l (describing over ninety reports, both foreign and
domestic, that concluded that "long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of
their special physical organization"); Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 190 (explaining how
progressive women-only labor legislation was premised on the notion that women were inferior
because of biological weaknesses and natural familial duties).
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Progressives advanced their ideas and initiatives by coupling "blithe
self-confidence" in their own ability to solve problems with a reckless reliance
on the "benevolence of the state." 94  This presupposition nourished a
commitment to state hegemony.195 Believing that the individual ought to serve
the state, and presuming that the remedy for the "chaotic individualism" of
America "was a 'regeneration' led by a hero-saint who could overthrow the
tired doctrines of liberal democracy in favor of a restored and heroic nation,"' 96
intellectuals pursued legal, sociological, and scientific theories that justified
their position regarding how "unemployable" individuals should be treated. 197
Labor unions were not immune to such ideas either. Consequentially, "as
unionization took hold among skilled workers, inequality among American
workers increased." 98 Between 1900 and 1920, "[t]he earnings gap between
skilled and unskilled workers was greater in America than anywhere else in the
world."l 99 As unions grew in power and influence, businesses sought out the
largest union organization of the time, the American Federation of Labor, in a
cartel-like attempt to quell labor unrest.200
Inspired by this emerging zeitgeist, nourished by unionists and others, and
led by Hobbesian ideas, o0 members of the political class regarded
unconstrained power as positive.202 This pernicious virus spread exponentially
during the Progressive Era. Progressive elites responded to the force of
Darwinian thought and the deduction "that the state was a natural, organic, and
spiritual expression of the people themselves." 203  Hence, they viewed the
204
state's growing power as wholly organic. In harmony with this view, "the
vast majority of progressive intellectuals . . . believed that the increase in state
194. See Andrew Scull, Progressive Dreams, Progressive Nightmares: Social Control in
20th Century America, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1981) (reviewing DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA (1980)) (discussing the response of progressives to the plight of the mentally ill and
handicapped).
195. Id. at 577.
196. GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 99.
197. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 179-90 (discussing the various progressive
theories linking race, gender, and ethnicity to work capacity).
198. MORENO, supra note 173, at 83.
199. Id
200. Id at 93.
201. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 72 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962)
("The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the power of most men, united
by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his
w ill .... ).
202. See GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 84-87 (discussing President Woodrow Wilson's
comprehensive conception of power and the state).
203. Id. at 86.
204. Id.
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205power was akin to an inevitable evolutionary process2. Embodying
Nietzsche's will to power,206 the progressives' predilection for expanding the
scope of state action 207 further enabled them to create legislation and social
policies that discriminated against those they saw as impediments to the
nation's success.208
Consistent with this vision, the expansionist state could not be constrained
by quaint documents such as the Constitution. Perhaps the best representative
of this viewpoint was President Woodrow Wilson, who did not believe that
state power ought to be thwarted by an "'antiquated' eighteenth-century
system of checks and balances."209 Instead of being restricted by old
documents, society was urged to embrace a living Darwinian constitution that
would enable the nation to "obey the laws of Life."210 Guided by such
revolutionary ideas, "Woodrow Wilson's first administration in 1913 set off
some of the most rapid and profound changes in the history of American labor
and race relations." 1 The Wilson administration was not alone in its effort to
change the labor-relations paradigm in America. After assuming the reigns of
government during the Progressive Era, especially at the state level, the
progressives sought "to engineer the diminution of both justice and democracy
for American blacks-who were enjoying little of either to begin with." 213
Although many progressives opposed these maneuvers,214 it would be a
mistake to forget that the resegregation of the U.S. Civil Service occurred
during President Wilson's time in office215 or that leading progressives-part
of the vanguard of reformist thought-were enthusiasts for the application of
205. Id.
206. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF
THE FUTURE 259 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1966) (explaining that higher
cultures arise because anything that is a living body is propelled by an inherent will to power, and
"it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant").
207. See Scull, supra note 194, at 577 ("Central, too, is a naive and dangerous faith in the
benevolence of the state and its agents-a faith that prompted the new generation of reformers to
promote program after program widening the scope of state action.").
208. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 15, at 4.
209. GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 88.
210. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. MORENO, supra note 173, at 117.
212. See e.g., EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175,
at 89-100 (discussing state labor regulations initiated by progressives).
213. Id. at 102-03 (quoting Charles Paul Freund, Dixiecrats Triumphant: The Secret History
of Woodrow Wilson, REASON.COM (Mar. 2003), http://reason.com/archives/2003/03/01/
dixiecrats-triumphant (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)).
214. Id. at 103.
215. Id at 102.
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eugenic remedies in order to protect the "higher elements" from being
"'swamped' by the black and brown hordes below." 216
Arising out of such a racially charged environment and striving to protect
the living standards of racially superior groups,217 progressives advanced their
assumptions through law reform initiatives that creative judicial interpretations
218
supported. Often advanced with vulpine efficiency, this contagious move
deployed contempt as a weapon and reached its inflection point in a pioneering
legal regime that was, in important respects, designed to exclude or suppress
laborers other than white males.219 The implementation and enforcement of
labor law became an exceptionally effective means of displacing biologically
suspect workers.220 Such efforts, frequently led by organized labor, were
sometimes rooted in white supremacist ideals, but, at other times, "the
economic benefits of exclusion" propelled labor-union efforts.221 Victims of
these progressive reforms were separated by gender,222 race, 223 and hereditary
incapacity224 from the rest of the population consistent with the deduction that
"an impressive array of human groups, male Anglo-Saxon heads of household
216. GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 247.
217. See Samuel Gompers, Talks on Labor: Addresses at St. Paul and Minneapolis, 12 AM.
FEDERATIONIST 636, 636 (1905) (exhibiting the sentiment of the time that "caucasians are not
going to let their standard of living be destroyed by negroes, Chinamen, Japs or any others"). "As
the depression worsened, undesirable jobs traditionally held by blacks became attractive to
whites . . . ." MORENO, supra note 173, at 163. Cities responded to this phenomenon by passing
ordinances that restricted blacks from working in certain jobs, and vigilante groups strongly
encouraged employers to fire their black employees. Id.
218. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 15, at 4.
219. See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at
102-03 (discussing the influence that progressive ideas had on many Supreme Court decisions
that upheld discriminatory practices).
220. See Hutchison, Employee Free Choice Act, supra note 20, at 396-400. For example,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the NRA, a result of the NIRA. Id at 396-97. The NRA
granted new collective-bargaining powers to unions, and trade unions seized this monopoly
power to oust laborers they disfavored. Id at 398.
221. Idat400.
222. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) (affirming the constitutionality ofa
statute that limited female laundry workers to a maximum of ten hours per day because of innate
female inferiority); EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
175, at 90-91 (explaining how Justice Louis Brandeis, using ideals of the Progressive tradition,
justified discrepancies in work hours between the genders by relying on sociological research).
223. See GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 247 (arguing that Darwinian thought led intellectuals
to believe that rapid population explosion was the result of modem technology that "removed the
natural constraints on population growth among the 'unfit"' and noting that "American
progressives were obsessed with the 'racial health' of the nation").
224. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (concluding that societal efficiency and
progress were sufficient reasons to sustain the removal of the plaintiffs reproductive capacity
because it was claimed that she inherited defective genes); see also PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE
GENERATIONS, No IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT AND BUCK V. BELL (2008)
(describing the progressive movement's pursuit of so-called "defectives" through legal reform).
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excepted, [were deemed] unworthy of work or 'unemployable."'225 This
movement took many forms and responded to the usual stimuli that labor
226
unions, intellectuals, and politicians supplied. As such, this campaign was,
in many respects, very comprehensive.
Provoked by the economic dislocation the Great Depression caused and
convinced by influential appeals of labor organizations, progressive leaders
227pressed for action. Originally, the Commerce Clause limited Congress's
authority to impose cartel-like arrangements.228 As Congress expanded its
power within a number of arenas in response to economic difficulties, courts
increasingly caved to legislative pressure to act.229 Legislators and courts,
embracing a constantly evolving conception of the Constitution, moved away
from a consensus suggesting that federalism required a limited interpretation of
the Commerce Clause; 230 this led to the passage of a large number of labor
statutes.231 Throughout the administrations of Presidents Herbert Hoover and
Franklin Roosevelt, progressives and labor unions employed the commerce
power, a form of federal police power, to transform industrial relations.232
Specifically, political and legislative action embraced the power of labor and
business cartels in the form of fair-competition statutes and the protection of
collective bargaining for private-sector employees. 233
225. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 180.
226. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 6. For example, in 1931, construction unions achieved
their goal of regulating the market through politics when Congress passed the Davis-Bacon Act,
which required federal construction contractors to pay the prevailing wage of the specific locale.
Id; see also Act of March 3, 1931, Pub. L. No. 71-798, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494, 1494 (codified as
amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-4148 (2006)). As David Bernstein shows, this law was sponsored
by racist legislators who sought to ensure that white labor-union members would not have to
compete with black workers. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 6. The Davis-Bacon Act was
followed by the 1932 enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which "placed sharp limitations on
the traditional ability of employers to obtain injunctions during labor disputes." EPSTEIN, THE
CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 2; see also Act of Mar. 23,
1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 1, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(2006)).
227. MORENO, supra note 173, at 164, 169.
228. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at 53.
229. See id at 54-68 (explaining that progressive claims that a race to the bottom would
ensue without federal legislation enabled Congress to regulate various industries based on the
necessity to ensure fair competition, including, for example, through the National Industrial
Recovery Act).
230. Id at 68-70.
231. See id at 66-67 (discussing how the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the
Commerce Clause enabled it to uphold the NLRA).
232. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 15, at 32.
233. See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at
64-68 (discussing statutes and regulations enacted as a result of the NIRA).
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These developments were constituent parts of the NRA, which resulted from
the NIRA.234 The NRA granted new collective-bargaining powers to unions,
which gave them the ability to exclude blacks from the labor market.235
Eagerly seizing this advantage and operating as "I'ob trusts," 236 organized labor
removed disfavored workers from their forces.23 One estimate demonstrates
that "the NIRA's minimum wage provisions destroyed the jobs of half a
million Blacks" in a short period of time,238 which supports the observation
that this statute served to "redistribute employment and resources from
blacks-the most destitute of Americans suffering from the Depression-to the
white masses." 239  Enhancing this remarkably repugnant record, Congress
240passed the NLRA, which continued some of the NIRA's policies,20 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which instituted "minimum wage provisions
[that] caused between 30,000 and 50,000 workers, mostly southern Blacks, to
lose their jobs within two weeks." 241 As a result of these laws, vast numbers of
blacks lost their jobs.24 2
The NLRA originally prohibited organized labor from excluding individuals
from unions because of discriminatory considerations, such as race.243
However, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) led the successful effort to
eliminate the antidiscrimination clause.244 Because most "New Dealers
accepted discrimination against blacks as an inevitable cost of economic
245
recovery," the Roosevelt administration was unruffled by this development.
In addition to raising the price of labor, New Deal legislation "not only
increased unemployment and human suffering, it also widened the
unemployment gap between blacks and whites."24 It was only natural that
234. See Somin, supra note 24, at 652 (discussing the intended functions of the NRA).
235. GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 155-56.
236. MORENO, supra note 173, at 4.
237. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 20, at 398.
238. Id. (citing David T. Beito, Review of Only One Place of Redress by David E. Bernstein,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 296 (2001) (book review)).
239. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass': The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 120 (1993)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Roots ofthe 'Underclass'].
240. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 94-99.
241. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 20, at 398.
242. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 94.
243. See id at 94-95 (explaining that the clause was dropped from the Act after Senator
Robert F. Wagner was pressured by labor-union advocates to do so).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting I HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW
DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE 54 (1978)).
246. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 2, at 825 (citing VEDDER & GALLAWAY,
supra note 171, at 272-79). Vedder & Gallaway show that racial differences in terms of
unemployment rates were essentially nonexistent between 1890 and 1930, but during the 1930s,
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progressives justified their programs and policies to the wider world by
focusing on the beneficiaries of such programs without fairly considering the
adverse effects of such policies.247 Although the economic isolation resulting
from progressive policy preferences continues to plague blacks and many
248others today, and though few contemporary commentators justify the racism
that infected labor-law reform initiatives throughout much of American
history, the distributional and moral consequences of this war on the
"unemployables" form an indispensable backdrop for accurately appreciating
the likely adverse consequences associated with the passage of the EFCA.
Whether the result of an intentional or an inadvertent policy, remnants of this
war on members of marginalized communities remain. Given the EFCA's
inescapable connection with this history, it is likely that this proposal
constitutes more of the same.
B. Pursuing Revenues in Order to Transform the Nation
"Contrary to the classical theory of the state as the provider of public
goods-goods, that is to say, which in virtue of their indivisibility and
non-excludability must be provided to all or none-modern states are above
all suppliers of private goods."249  This concept has diminished the
independence and vitality of institutions, which otherwise serve as the
"life-blood of civil society."250 As a consequence, the freedoms of the
individual and of contractual liberty have decreased, while the scope of
hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations has increased. 251 This result has
led to "the erosion of civil society by an expansionist state," which, in turn, has
federal-government initiatives widened the unemployment gap between black and white workers
and contributed to increased income inequality. VEDDER & GALLAWAY, supra note 171, at 272,
278-79. The following table captures the widening gap.
RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Year White Nonwhite
1890-1930 (average) 5.82% 5.90%
1940 9.50% 10.89%
1950 4.90% 9.00%
1975 7.80% 13.80%
1990 4.70% 10.10%
See id. at 272 tbls 14.1 & 14.2.
247. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIvES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at 72.
248. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 20, at 371-72.
249. GRAY, supra note 1, at I1.
250. Id. at 12.
251. Id.
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resulted in "the outbreak of a political war of redistribution."252 John Gray
aptly summarizes this development:
From being an umpire which enforces the rules of the game of
civil association, the state has become the most potent weapon in an
incessant political conflict for resources. Its power is sought, in part
because of the vast assets it already owns or controls, but also
because no private or corporate asset is safe from invasion or
confiscation by the state. From being a device whereby the peaceful
coexistence of civil association is assured, the state becomes itself an
instrument of predation, the arena within which a legal war of all
against all is fought out. The rules of the game of civil
association-the laws specifying property rights, contractual liberties
and acceptable modes of voluntary association-are now themselves
objects of capture.253
In light of the rich possibilities associated with capture, corporate interests,
including labor organizations, pressure regulatory authorities, through lobbying
and the like, to create regulations that suit their agendas. 254
Given these developments, it would be a mistake to believe that labor
unions, one of America's leadinq lobbying and pressure groups with more than
$17 billion in annual revenues, 5s were simply supporting the EFCA on the
basis of the broad public interest. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
unions spend only a fraction-perhaps less than twenty percent-of their dues
revenues "on collective bargaining and related activities." 256 Correspondingly,
labor unions occupy nine of the top twenty spots on a recent list of America's
leading contributors to political parties. 257
252. Id
253. Id.
254. Id
255. LINDA CHAVEZ & DANIEL GRAY, BETRAYAL: How UNION BOSSES SHAKE DOWN
THEIR MEMBERS AND CORRUPT AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (2004) (explaining also that labor
unions are not taxed on their revenue).
256. Id The U.S. Supreme Court conducted a detailed examination of union financial
records in two cases. See ROBERT P. HUNTER ET AL., MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE
MICHIGAN UNION ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: A STEP TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DEMOCRACY IN LABOR ORGANIZATION 15 (2001), available at http://www.mackinac.org/s
2001-02 (follow "Download PDF of the entire publication" hyperlink). In Communication
Workers v. Beck, the Court held that seventy-nine percent of the plaintiffs union dues were not
chargeable to collective bargaining and related activities. Id. (citing ROBERT HUNTER,
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, COMPULSORY UNION DUES IN MICHIGAN 16 (1977)); see
also Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 740, 745 (1988). In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass 'n, the Court determined that the union spent ninety percent of its dues revenue on
nonrepresentational activities. Id. (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991)).
257. Top Overall Donors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/top
contribs.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
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Organizing efforts of labor unions can have at least two objectives: (1) broad
political, economic, and social transformation of society, which provides
private benefits to union hierarchs; and (2) financial gains for workers. As a
result of this dynamic, labor unions have an incentive to blur the line between
the political and social benefits, and the economic gains accruing to unionized
259
workers. This gives rise to the possibility that EFCA advocacy is not
necessarily driven by an impartial desire or intent to provide disinterested
benefits to workers by way of improved wages and benefits. Instead of acting
as trustees of the livelihood of rank and file members, and rather than
concentrating their political advocacy on efforts that protect or expand
workers' economic clout within the work place, labor unions, facing only
nominal financial-disclosure requirements, are likely often propelled by the
objective of acquiring transformational political power. The successful
purchase of transformational power supplies ideological benefits to union
hierarchs and their political and philosophic allies. This syllogism manifests
itself in evidence that organized labor has previously lent its political and
financial support to highly contested issues, such as efforts to decriminalize
marijuana, freeze nuclear weapons, and expand abortion rights 261-activities
that are not central to the improvement of wages and working conditions for
the rank and file.
When union hierarchs advance union funds to finance controversial
propositions, it underscores a persistent intra-union conflict rooted in the
political and social interests of union leaders that tend to oppose the objectives
of workers.262 Tensions surface when labor leaders view union members and
their dues as powerful instruments for achieving their own aims.263 Given that
labor unions only spend a fraction of revenues on collective-bargaining-related
activities264 and that the appeal of individualism and other values hinder union
solidarity, rational workers will often resist union-organizing efforts.265
Although many workers, and virtually all employers, have incentives to resist
unionization, union hierarchs, guided by their own rational self interests, have
the opposite incentives.266 This claim is bolstered by evidence of "the
258. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1392.
259. Id at 1395.
260. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 256, at 3 (providing that the absence of financial
oversight is a reason that unions can use dues for activities other than collective bargaining).
261. See CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 255, at 18 (listing political issues that unions have
financially supported).
262. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1317.
263. See id at 1316-17 (discussing motivations of union leaders and noting that these are not
always consistent with the desires of union members).
264. Id at 1315-16.
265. Id at 1321.
266 See id at 1317
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autocracy, entrenchment, and corruption of some union leaders."267 Similarly,
the evidence shows that "union elections provide members with little real
,,268
control over leaders, suggesting that unions are often "inherently
undemocratic." 269
With these incentives, unions have embarked on an aggressive strategy of
intermingling politics and union organizing.270 A commitment to the
combination of organizing efforts and political power27 provides a strong
explanation for union support of the EFCA, which, if passed, will provide
additional opportunities to enrich union coffers.272 Gary Becker explains that
"[p]olitical influence is not simply fixed by the political process, but can be
expanded by expenditures of time and money on campaign contributions,
political advertising, and in other ways that exert political pressure." 273
Consistent with this, union leaders insist that "the only way to start winning
,,274[political] elections [is] to organize". Because successful organizing
campaigns provide labor leaders with additional dues revenue to fund their
private objectives, it is likely that leaders and their political allies have
self-interested reasons for proposing and supporting the EFCA.
Although labor-union advocates see unions as communal institutions that
must thrive in order to create a society imbued with the values of social and
economic justice and industrial and social peace,275 crumbling worker
solidarity impairs union capacity to fashion a durable community. As a
consequence, union-density rates have fallen sharply from their peak during
267. Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy and the Market for Union Control,
1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 367, 368 (footnotes omitted).
268. Id. at 369 (citing Edgar N. James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and
Insurgency in National Union Elections, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247 (1978)).
269. Id at 370.
270. See Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1317 (noting, for example, that
the "president of the AFL-CIO ... proclaimed that labor unions would tie their politics to union
organizing").
271. Id. at 1317-18.
272. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 111.
273. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372 (1983). Moreover, "[g]roups, like individual human beings,
are not animated simply by pecuniary gain. They are also animated by ideological and social
objectives that provide both self-interested and nonexcludable benefits." Hutchison, A Clearing
in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1318 (footnote omitted).
274. Jill Lawrence, Democrats Ponder Labor Split's Political Effect: Unions Have Been
Central to Party's Election Successes, USA TODAY, July 27, 2005, at 4A.
275. Harry G. Hutchison, Compulsory Unionism as a Fraternal Conceit? Free Choice for
Workers: A History ofthe Right to Work, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 125, 164 (2006) [hereinafter
Hutchison, Compulsory Unionism].
276. See Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1319, 1321, 1332.
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the 1940s and 1950s. 277 Reacting to this development, union activists and their
278ideological allies have become despondent. They rightly see the present
state of the labor movement "as the crystallizing apogee of their discontent." 279
As John Gray explains, union hierarchs and their ideological allies now have
additional reasons to redouble their efforts to achieve their goals through
politics.280 If workers are unwilling to join a labor organization, if they are
averse to voluntarily funding labor-union hierarchs' political preferences, and
if they refuse to freely enlist in the war for social justice, then their interests
will be hindered by the provisions of the EFCA, which shrink contractual
liberties and offer the prospect of worker coercion coupled with mandatory
arbitration, resulting in a "first contract."281 Whether or not card-check
signatures are obtained through fabrication or intimidation, they ultimately
yield additional revenues while subordinating the individual worker's
interest.282 This deduction is consistent with the observation that Nietzsche
was, for the most part, correct: "while the will to power has always been
present, American democracy increasingly operates within a political
culture-that is, a framework of meaning-that sanctions a will to
domination." 283
Because politics abets dominance, the EFCA constitutes an ideal vehicle to
284
advance the political goals and objectives of union hierarchs. This predatory
process undermines the democratic aspirations of union workers in two ways.
First, through its card-check scheme, the EFCA gives priority to certifying a
labor organization as the collective-bargaining representative without ordering
a secret-ballot election and without allowing workers to decertify an existing
labor organization.285 Second, though the original NLRA was designed to
avoid compelling the parties to come to an agreement and to avoid imposing
government supervision of the agreement's terms, 286  the EFCA's
277. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 10
("[T]he level of private sector unionization has fallen from its high of about 35 percent of eligible
workers in 1954 . . . ."); Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of "Fee Speech "-Restrictions on the Use of
Union Dues to Fund New Organizing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 642 (1988) (discussing the
"dramatic decline in union strength since the end of World War II" and noting that in 1947, union
membership was at 35.3%).
278. Hutchison, Compulsory Unionism, supra note 275, at 166.
279. Id.
280. GRAY, supra note 1, at 12.
281. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 5-6,
9.
282. See id at 45-47.
283. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 109.
284. See EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
6-8.
285. Id at 5, 21.
286. S. Rep. No. 74-573, at 12 (1935).
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mandatory-arbitration provision enables arbitrators to impose a contract
without the agreement of the parties. 287  In addition, under the EFCA,
rank-and-file members of the union are not required to ratify a contract.288
The EFCA's capability to subvert union democracy is further emphasized by
recalling that unions expend a large fraction of their revenues for
non-collective-bargaining purposes, reflecting the fact that "expenditures for
political and related puroses continue to rise on a per member basis while
membership declines."2  As referenced above, this pattern indicates that
unions persistently pursue financial revenues in order to vigorously participate
in America's political contest for economic, social, and ideological resources
rather than to concentrate on the narrow economic interests of their
members.290 Taken together, this implies that, at most, collective bargaining
for the benefit of workers is a secondary objective of union-organizing
campaigns, which belies public-interest claims made on behalf of the EFCA.
C. Fashioning a More Comprehensive Critique of the EFCA
Among the many strengths of Richard Epstein's critique of the EFCA is the
persistent clarity of his analysis. He briefly and correctly places the EFCA
within America's labor-law pantheon as part of an evolutionary move aimed at
displacing judge-made law-a process of legal reform that commenced almost
a century ago. 9 On a parallel track, progressives sought to increase the level
of government intervention through both a broad understanding of the police
power and an expansive interpretation of the commerce power. 2 The NLRA
emerged as the centerpiece of this transformational process.293
Although the NLRA, as originally enacted, expressed a strong preference for
labor organizations, most contemporary workers have rejected this policy
294preference, conducing to a sharp decline in private-sector unionization.
Provoked by this decline, labor advocates have offered a plethora of proposals
287. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11Ith Cong. § 3(h)(3) (2009).
288. Id.
289. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 4, at 1316 (citing Joe Knollenberg, The
Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for
Political Purposes, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 350 (1998)).
290. Id. at 1316-17.
291. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 1.
During the Progressive Era, the federal government began to grant special privileges to labor
unions. See id. at 1-2. This move commenced with a statute that "insulated labor unions from
the application of all antitrust laws," and it culminated with the passage of laws that conferred
special privileges on labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining and of limiting
employers' right to obtain injunctions during labor disputes. Id.
292. See EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSiVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at
66-70, 102.
293. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 4.
294. Id at 4, 10-11, 18.
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designed to restore unions to prominence.295 The EFCA is one of many such
efforts, which are justified on the grounds that "private sector labor
law . . . has shrunk in its reach, and its significance, and is clearly ailing." 296
This impairs "workers' efforts to advance their own shared interests through
self-organization and collective protest, pressure, negotiation, and agreement
with employers." 297 This observation fuels the contention that a gap exists
between "the desire for and the supply of collective representation in
workplace governance," and that employer abuse drives this lacuna. 298
Explaining why this thesis is unsustainable, Epstein's inspection of the EFCA
offers a corrective showing that the employer-abuse allegation is supported by
groundless presumptions. 9 As Epstein deftly explains, employee and
employer resistance to unionization can be both "rational" and "defensible."300
And he is not alone in this assertion. 301 Hence, it appears that reliance on the
employer-abuse thesis to explain declining unionization represents the triumph
of ideology over empirical evidence. Continued reliance on this thesis appears
to be a form of self-deception that sustains union suzerainty and worker
subordination.
Conversely, resistance can enhance social welfare. Turning to these
considerations, Epstein reasons that the criticism of progressive initiatives
"does not depend upon any exaggerated sense of individualism"; instead, its
very decisiveness "depends on an overall programmatic critique that examines
the effect that policy initiatives have on the full range of relevant parties."302
This means that only those initiatives that contribute to the common good
295. See, e.g., Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining Union Vitality: New Approaches to
Union Growth, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 337, 337-53. These proposals included the following:
effectuating new and better organizing efforts; deploying corporate campaigns; bargaining to
organize, through which a union seeks to expand recognition within a corporation once some of
its employees are organized; deploying union-lobbying advantages, whereby firms seeking to
expand in an area gain the trust of unions by agreeing not to oppose unions in exchange for the
coercive transfer of public resources that benefit the firm; using public procurement and
contracting power to force employers to bend to union organizing attempts; and advocating and
enacting state and local laws that change the environment to assist labor-union organizing efforts.
Id.
296. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1527 (2002).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1528-29 (citing "brazen employer resistance" as an explanation for the lack of
union representation).
299. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
124-26.
300. Id. at 124-25 (noting the losses employers generally incur from unionization).
301. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 79, at 695-98 (repudiating the current viability of the
employer-hostility thesis and showing that employers were much more hostile to labor unions
during the 1940s).
302. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at 73.
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should survive. 3 03  On this score, the EFCA is clearly deficient. Taken
together, Epstein's crisp analysis destabilizes the legitimacy of attempts to
strengthen unionism through legislation.
Equally clear is Epstein's argument that it is difficult to offer a
comprehensive critique of the EFCA "without undertaking a close examination
of some of the defects of [America's] current labor law system," because the
"EFCA only exaggerates [the system's] flaws." 304 Taking up this challenge,
this Article shows that the EFCA's own flaws stem from its entrenched
hierarchical assumptions, which are tied to the inevitability of progress,
demanding that certain workers be excluded or otherwise subordinated in order
for the nation to advance. Prescinding from the pursuit of equal rights for all
workers-males, females, and members of various ethnic groups-labor
unions were established during the Progressive Era in order to gain benefits at
the expense of others, particularly members of biologically suspect classes.305
When empowered by the state through the passage of legislation creating labor
cartels, this policy preference produced a net social loss and constrained
human liberty. At times, labor-union policy was grounded in notions of
biological superiority; at other times, it was premised on the economic
advantages of exclusion. 306 In either case, labor unions' pursuit of monopoly
power, in combination with the racial animosity unleashed by the political and
intellectual class during the Progressive Era, provided a sturdy foundation for
New Deal labor-law reform. Reform produced rather toxic fruit: the
persistent exclusion of large numbers of Americans from the workforce.
In addition to the social cost and welfare losses imposed by President
Roosevelt's policies during the 1930s and 1940s, members of marginalized
groups continue to suffer adverse repercussions from New Deal policies and
subordinating assumptions rooted in labor-law statutes today. 30 Consistent
303. Id.
304. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at 175.
305. See MORENO, supra note 173, at 81-136 (describing the interaction between blacks and
labor unions during the Progressive Era); supra text accompanying notes 217-25.
306. See MORENO, supra note 173, at 97-98.
307. See id. at 137 (explaining the evolving national reaction from the Progressive Era to the
New Deal).
308. GOLDBERG, supra note 174, at 268-69. Goldberg explains that the
relevant repercussions of Progressive Era ideas have escaped the light of scrutiny. The
architects of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Great Society all inherited and built
upon the progressive welfare state. And they did this in explicit terms, citing such
prominent race builders as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as their
inspirations. Obviously, the deliberate racist intent in many of these polices was not
shared by subsequent generations of liberals. But that didn't erase the racial content of
the policies themselves. The Davis-Bacon Act still hurts low-wage blacks, for
example. FDR's labor and agricultural policies threw millions of blacks out of work
and off their land.
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with this conclusion, "the widening unemployment gap between white and
black Americans that commenced during the Great Depression," in response to
the progressive statutory innovation, is growing stronger and more resilient in
present-day America. 309 Minimum-wage laws in the United States, like similar
efforts in apartheid-era South Africa, continue to disproportionately deprive
members of marginalized groups of employment.310 Following the passage of
the 1965 Civil Rights Act, and operating through the collective-bargaining
process, labor unions have "played a crucial role in institutionalizing a variety
of discriminatory practices." 3 Remarkably, this narrative proceeds logically
with the deduction that biology entitles white workers "to more desirable job
classifications and to 'inherent' white employment privileges." 312
This record reinforces Epstein's claim that the implementation of the EFCA
produces union benefits that are unevenly distributed among workers.313 In
addition to this distributive difference, which is a function of seniority within a
unionized workforce, a thorough assessment of the adverse distributive effects
that are a function of race, ethnicity, and the individual's placement within the
union hierarchy would further strengthen Epstein's case against the EFCA.
The adverse consequences associated with New Deal labor law should serve as
the canary in the coal mine by suggesting that Americans ought to be wary of
the EFCA's claimed benefits. However, to be fair, no EFCA advocates have
explicitly embellished their support of this proposal with the language of racial
animus that characterized the Progressive Era-language that propelled the
enactment of laws such as the Davis-Bacon Act and operated as part of the
framework of union privilege. 314
Id.
309. Harry G. Hutchison, Racial Exclusion in the Mirror of the New Deal Responses to the
Great Crash, 15 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 5, 13 (2009-10) (reviewing JONAH GOLDBERG,
LIBERAL FASCISM: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT: FROM MUSSOLINI TO THE
POLITICS OF MEANING (2007)).
310. Harry Hutchison, Toward A Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93,
126-30 (1997).
311. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK,
AND THE LAW 5 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1985) (1977).
312. Id.
313. See EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT, supra note 28, at
4-9.
314. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 15, at 191-92 (showing how the law honors the
progressive legacy of Robert Bacon, the Davis-Bacon Act's co-author, who "denied anti-African
American animus, but made clear his discomfort with 'defective' workers taking jobs that were
assumed to belong to white union men").
Nonetheless notable are the recent comments of a Democratic congressman, who
successfully supported financial-regulatory reform on grounds that it benefits the racially superior
among us as opposed to the "unfit" and biologically-suspect minorities and "defectives." Andrew
Malcolm, Rep. Paul Kanjorski Says His Plan Helps 'Good American People, 'Not 'Minorities'or
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III. CONCLUSION
No longer captivated by the belief that unions should be seen simply as
limited organizations designed to further self-government by workers oriented
toward their own narrow economic interest, contemporary union leaders and
their allies now believe that unions ought to "be conceived as the robust engine
of collective insurgency against globalization . . . [and] class-based
injustice." 3 15 This shifting meta-narrative, posited as an ontology of necessity
and embraced as a compelling faith, is catalyzed by a reduction in worker
solidarity. No longer able to capture the hearts and minds of workers and no
longer animated by workers' narrow interests, organized labor-the
beneficiary of government intervention in the past-has, once again, turned to
politics to achieve the broad goals of political, social, and economic
transformation. 316
The possibility of achieving these objectives, which cannot otherwise be
obtained through a voluntary, freely chosen process, unleashes incentives that
motivate interest groups and their leaders to capture the coercive power of the
state. The demand by pressure groups for ever-expanding government
intervention is an understandable outgrowth of the fact that "the State has
permeated civil society to such an extent that the two are mostly
indistinguishable." 317 Implicit in this demand is the conclusion that, as the
government becomes more scientific and accepts the possibility that it can
manipulate human action, "[g]overnment itself becomes a hierarchy of
bureaucratic managers" and experts, whose arbitrary power is justified by the
claim that they possess knowledge resources and competencies that most
citizens do not. Although human liberty is always at risk in the face of the
demand for government intervention in society, the purchase of government
power serves private ends. The EFCA constitutes a clear example of this
ruinous process that continues to consume western democracies.
Richard Epstein's book, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act,
constitutes a public service as it illustrates the pitfalls of state-sponsored cartels
'Defective' People, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2010, 2:32 AM), http://latimesblogs.la
times.com/washington/2010/06/democrat-paul-kanjorski-defective-americans.html. Given the
public expression of such sentiments rooted in hierarchy and subordination, it is possible to infer
that those attitudes are merely the tip of the exclusionary iceberg infecting other legislation,
including the EFCA. Equally clear, the tacit acceptance of such sentiments within the domain of
labor law would serve to redistribute benefits from workers and employers to union leaders and
their allies.
315. Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A
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448-49 (2000).
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and their debilitating public-policy implications. His analysis exposes the
Employee Free Choice Act as a disingenuous proposal that, rather than
promising an increase in human liberty, creates a system that opposes the
rights of the rank and file to freely choose labor representation. Although the
EFCA and its misleading title recall the Roosevelt administration's reliance on
deception to pass unpopular measures without public support, Epstein's book
serves the public interest without misleading its readers. His book offers a
sharp contrast to the proclivity of modem mass democracies, which have
increasingly succumbed to the temptation of supplying private goods for
powerful constituencies. Nevertheless, Epstein's analysis could be enriched by
exposing the permanent defects in the labor-reform agenda-defects that
originated more than a century ago. His critique could also be enhanced by
exhibiting far greater skepticism toward the EFCA's attempt to enshrine
organized labor's pursuit of additional dues revenue to fund its insistent search
for political, economic, and social transformation.
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